



RIPE NCC

RIPE NETWORK COORDINATION CENTRE

RIPE Atlas

Ethical and Security Aspects of
Running an IoT Network

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RIPE Atlas Infrastructure



RIPE Atlas is a **global, open, distributed** Internet measurement platform, consisting of thousands of measurement devices that measure **Internet connectivity** in real time.
(wikipedia)



RIPE Atlas Use Cases



- Measuring Internet access disruptions
 - Internet Access Disruptions in Turkey
 - Internet Access Disruption in Gambia
- Measuring DNS censorship and hijacking
 - Using DNS Servers in Iran
 - DNS Censorship
- Monitoring connectivity problems
 - Monitoring Game Service Connectivity
 - Measuring Cloud Connectivity
 - Debugging Network Connectivity Problems



RIPE Atlas in Numbers

- 10,000 probes and 400 anchors connected worldwide
- 5.6% IPv4 ASes and 9% IPv6 ASes covered
- 181 countries covered
- 7,000 measurements per second



Design Principles



- Low, cheap barrier of entry
- Active measurements only
 - Probes do not observe user traffic
- Data, API, tools, source code: FREE and OPEN
- Set of measurement types limited
 - ping, traceroute, SSL/TLS, NTP, HTTP (limited)
- Strong community involvement from the start

Ethical Considerations




- No bandwidth measurements
 - Other platforms provide that service
- HTTP measurements only towards RIPE Atlas anchors
 - Otherwise it would rely on hosts' bandwidth
 - And might put volunteer at risk
- We encourage users to think about ethical considerations
 - Ethics of RIPE Atlas Measurements



Securing RIPE Atlas


RIPE Atlas Architecture



How We Limit Consequences (1)



- Prevent re-use and re-purposing of probes
 - Decided against Trusted Platform Model (TPM)
 - Instead, we use cheap devices and discourage re-using them
 - Accepting possible loss of probes
- Initialisation procedure before distribution
 - Off-the-shelf firmware gets replaced with RIPE Atlas firmware
 - Generating and registering individual keys
 - Testing



How We Limit Consequences (2)



- Trust anchors installed on all probes
 - Two-way authentication; unique SSH key for probes and for identification
- Regular firmware updates
 - All firmware updates are signed
 - Pre-installed public keys to verify firmware signature before upgrading
- Mechanisms to detect unwanted behaviour
 - We're looking for outliers or protocol violations
- No direct services to host or network
 - No local configuration possible; reduces network-based attack surface

Firmware Upgrades



- Done in a “lazy fashion”
 - Upgraded next time probes connect to RIPE Atlas infrastructure
 - We have means to force them to upgrade faster
- Each update is cryptographically verified



Best Current Practices



- IETF draft document: BCP for Securing IoT Devices
 - <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moore-iot-security-bcp-01>
- RIPE Labs: <https://labs.ripe.net>
 - [RIPE Atlas Probes as IoT Devices](#)
 - [RIPE Atlas Architecture - How we Manage our Probes](#)